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The current debate in the U.S. Human Spaceflight Program focuses on the development of the next 
generation of man-rated heavy lift launch vehicles. While launch vehicle systems are of critical 
importance for future exploration, a comprehensive analysis of the entire exploration infrastructure is 
required to avoid costly pitfalls at early stages of the design process. This paper addresses this need by 
presenting a Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework for integrated architectural analysis of future 
in-orbit infrastructure for human space exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit. The paper is structured in 
two parts. 
The first part consists of an expert elicitation study to identify objectives for the in-space transportation 
infrastructure. The study was conducted between November 2011 and January 2012 with fifteen senior 
experts involved with human spaceflight in the United States and Europe. The elicitation study included 
the formation of three expert panels representing exploration, science, and policy stakeholders to be 
engaged in a 3-round Delphi study. Rationale behind the Delphi approach, as translated from social 
science research, is discussed. A novel version of the Delphi method is presented and applied in the 
context of technical decision-making and systems architecting. 
The second part of the paper describes a tradespace exploration study of in-orbit infrastructure coupled 
with requirements definition analysis informed by expert elicitation. Requirements and stakeholder goal 
uncertainties are explicitly considered in the analysis. The final result is an integrated view of perceived 
stakeholder needs within the human spaceflight community. Needs are translated into requirements and 
coupled to system architectures of interest for further analysis. Results include a correlation analysis 
between exploration, science, and policy goals. Pareto analysis is used to identify architectures of interest 
for further consideration by decision-makers.  
The paper closes with a summary of insights and develops a strategy for evolutionary development of 
the exploration infrastructure of the incoming decades. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While NASA has already selected the Space 
Launch System as the new man-rated launch 
vehicle (Aliakbargolkar, Wicht et al. 2011; 
Chang 2011), one important question that is still 
open is the definition of the remaining 
architectural elements of the transportation  
infrastructure.  
This paper supports the architecting process 
of the future US human spaceflight program by 
implementing a Delphi-based Systems 
Architecting Framework (DB-SAF) 
(Aliakbargolkar 2012) for comprehensive 
architecting of the in-orbit transportation 
infrastructure. DB-SAF supports objective 
definition by identifying and characterizing 
ambiguities in value objectives through expert 
elicitation, allowing experts to negotiate with 
each other through an anonymous and interactive 
process, and view the impact of their preferences 
in the architectural tradespace. The analysis is 
structured in two parts: first, possible objectives 
for the infrastructure are explored through an 
expert elicitation approach, with the goal of 
identifying objectives and characterizing 
associated technical, scientifical, and political 
uncertainties. The study involved experts from 
NASA, ESA, academia and industry. The second 
part of the paper performs a tradespace 
exploration based on value metrics developed 
through expert elicitation, developing 
recommendations on the architecting process.  
The paper demonstrates how DB-SAF can be 
used to characterize and mitigate ambiguity in 
system-level objectives, therefore being an 
effective decision-making support for system 
architects of large engineering infrastructures. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section II provides motivations and historical 
context, framing the study as relevant to the 
human spaceflight program. Section III describes 
the objectives of the study. Section IV describes 
the approach used in this paper, that is the 
Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework 
(DB-SAF), and describes the results that have 
been achieved on its implementation to the in-
space infrastructure architecting problem. 
Section V summarizes paper findings for 
consideration by decision-makers concerned 
with the development of the future in-space 
infrastructure for human exploration.  
 
II. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTEXT 
 
This section provides the framing context that 
motivated the research, including relevant 
historic background on the US human 
spaceflight program. NASA is presently called to 
charter a path for its future plans for human 
exploration. In 2004, President Bush started the 
Constellation Program with the ambitious plan 
of returning astronauts to the surface of the 
Moon (NASA 2004). Following six years of 
development and a cumulative investment of 
$9B billion USD (Chang 2010), a Presidential 
panel was chartered with the goal of assessing 
the status of the US Human Spaceflight Program 
and provide recommendations to the White 
House for future development of the American 
manned spaceflight program (the “Augustine 
Committee”) (NASA 2009). The Committee 
found the US human spaceflight program to be 
“on an unsustainable trajectory <…> 
perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing 
goals that do not match allocated resources” 
(NASA 2009). Following this review, the 
Obama Administration cancelled Constellation 
and the programs cancelled therein, such as the 
Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles (Connolly 
2006). Eventually, in July 2011 the Space 
Shuttle completed its last flight and transitioned 
to its decommissioning phase, marking the end 
of an era in human spaceflight (Chang 2011). 
In September 2011, NASA announced the 
development of the Space Launch System (SLS) 
as the next generation launch vehicle for future 
human exploration (NASA 2011). While most 
efforts have been focused on the development of 
the launch system, less effort seems to have been 
spent upfront on the remaining elements of the 
exploration infrastructure. This is partly due to 
political uncertainty on overall program 
objectives, which make difficult to commit to 
any hardware development that can constrain 
destination selection and other program 
objectives in successive development phases. 
Stakeholders do not share a unified vision on 
what constitutes value for the exploration 
enterprise. They have variegate perspectives on 
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the intrisic value of space exploration. Debates 
generate ambiguities that must be identified, 
characterized, and successively mitigated 
through careful strategy to define a robust 
transportation architecture.  
 
III. OBJECTIVES 
 
This paper characterizes and identifies 
ambiguities in system objectives for the in-orbit 
transportation infrastructure for human space 
exploration. It provides a characterization of the 
debate on “what is value” in future  human 
spaceflight programs as perceived by a panel of 
experts. Based on this analysis, the paper 
enumerates feasible architecture for the in-space 
infrastructure, and identifies architectures of 
interest while developing recommendations for 
further consideration by decision-makers. 
Architectures are filtered through proxy metrics 
for cost, schedule, and risk.  
 
IV. APPROACH AND RESULTS 
This section presents the approach that has 
been used for the analysis of in-orbit 
infrastructure presented in this paper, and the 
results that have been obtained by its 
implementation. The proposed approach is called 
Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework 
(DB-SAF) (Aliakbargolkar 2012). DB-SAF is an 
iterative approach integrating expert elicitation 
and computational systems architecting. DB-
SAF supports the definition of system 
architectures under ambiguous stakeholder 
objectives, that is when stakeholders have a 
plurality of contrasting views on what 
capabilities should be implemented in the 
system, and what constitutes value for the 
architecture. DB-SAF is  inspired by the Delphi 
method from social science research (Rowe, 
Wright et al. 1991; Rowe and Wright 1999), and 
develops an engineering Delphi approach that is 
integrated with computational systems 
architecting techniques developed at MIT in 
recent years (Koo 2005; Simmons 2008). An 
overview of the DB-SAF approach is shown in 
Figure 1. DB-SAF allows experts to be included 
in the definition of a systems architecting 
problem, and to interact between each other in 
anonymous form in negotiating judgements on 
questions of interest – for instance, on what 
constitutes value for an exploration 
infrastructure. This approach is iterative, as 
experts go through several iteration rounds until 
convergence criteria are met. An in-depth 
explanation of the DB-SAF methodology can be 
found in (Aliakbargolkar 2012). This section of 
the paper shows how DB-SAF has been 
implemented for the in-space exploration 
infrastructure systems architecting problem. In 
the sub-sections that follow, steps make 
reference to the step numbering shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Step 1 – Literature Review 
The first step in DB-SAF is a literature search 
to inform the architecting study. In particular, the 
goal is to find evidence on how previous system 
architectures were evaluated in terms of value 
judgments: figures of merit, evaluation metrics, 
and so forth. The literature in human spaceflight 
mission architectures is very rich, as several 
Literature Review Systems-specific expertise
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Figure 1 Delphi-Based Systems Architecting Framework (DB-SAF) 
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proposals and mission architectures were studied 
in the last fifty years. The main references 
considered in the study presented in this paper 
are the major design efforts in this direction 
starting from 2000 with particular emphasis on 
NASA and MIT human spaceflight studies. 
Among others, this study considered findings 
from MIT-Draper’s Concept Exploration and 
Refinement Exploration Systems Architecture 
Study (MIT and Draper 2005), NASA’s 
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) 
(NASA 2004; NASA 2005), the Mars Design 
Reference Architecture 5.0 (Drake 2009), and 
the NASA architectures for human missions on 
Near Earth Asteroids (NASA 2010; Culbert 
2011). 
 
Step 2 – Problem Formulation 
Identification of questions of interest 
This paper aims to address the following 
questions of relevance to the systems 
architecting problem of in-space transportation 
infrastructure for human exploration beyond 
Low Earth Orbit: 
- What destinations should we consider 
pursuing for the US human exploration 
program of the next thirty years? 
- What types of mission (orbit / surface / short 
stay / long stay) should we consider as 
effective compromise between exploration 
value, science and policy return? 
- What are the main tradeoffs in exploration 
value, science return and policy return in 
architecting the in-space transportation 
infrastructure for human exploration? How 
do these metrics affect the architecting 
process as evaluated by performance, cost 
and risk metrics, and what is the impact of 
ambiguity in this context? 
Goals identification 
As the rationale for human space exploration 
is fairly diverse within stakeholders, there is no 
crisply defined goal on which stakeholders agree 
for required in-space infrastructure for manned 
spaceflight. For the purposes of this paper, we 
will consider a subset of the main Key 
Supporting Objectives (KSO) for human space 
exploration defined by the Global Exploration 
Roadmap (GER) of the International Space 
Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG 2011) 
relevant to the in-space transportation 
infrastructure architecture:  
- Extend Human Presence  [KSO 1] 
- Develop Exploration Technologies and 
Capabilities   [KSO 2] 
- Perform Science to Support Human 
Exploration    [KSO 3] 
- Stimulate Economic Expansion [KSO 4] 
- Perform Space, Earth, and Applied Science 
     [KSO 5] 
- Engage Public in Exploration  [KSO 6] 
The Global Exploration Roadmap derives 
objectives from these goals, however, it does not 
provide rationale on how these objectives are 
linked to each other and how should they be 
prioritized in the program. For instance, boil-off 
control and in-situ resource utilization are both 
objectives mapped to KSO 2 in GER. This paper 
addresses these questions concurrently and 
identifies interactions between technology 
investments, providing insight for future 
developments.  
 
Functional decomposition 
Functions are form-neutral statements derived 
from the goals as expressed by stakeholders, also 
referred to as functional requirements. The in-
space transportation infrastructure has been 
modeled with the following functional 
decomposition: 
- Providing Habitation to astronauts at all 
phases during the Length of the mission 
- Transporting People and Cargo from Low 
Earth Orbit to the Destination 
Two main sources of ambiguity that have been 
underlined: the length of the mission, which is 
determined by the chosen mission mode, the 
time spent at the destination and the choice of 
the destination itself; and destinations, which 
choice drives value delivery to exploration, 
science and policy stakeholders.  
Requirements enumeration 
 
Areas of potential ambiguity impacting 
definition of requirements include the following 
requirement variables: 
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- The choice of a destination (affecting value 
delivery to stakeholders in goals KSO 1, 
KSO 2, KSO 3, KSO 4, KSO 5, KSO 6) 
- Characteristics associated with NEA 
destinations, such as characteristic size and 
internal composition (affecting value 
delivery to stakeholders in goals KSO 2, 
KSO 3, KSO 4, KSO 6) 
- The number of crew in the mission 
(affecting value delivery to stakeholders in 
goals KSO 1, KSO 2, KSO 3, KSO 6) 
- Exploration time available at the 
destination for exploration and science 
activities (affecting value delivery to 
stakeholders in goals KSO 1, KSO 2, KSO 3, 
KSO 4, KSO 5, KSO 6)  
- The time of flight of the mission, as a 
proxy measure of health risk to astronauts 
due to exposure to the harsh radiation 
environment beyond Low Earth Orbit 
(affecting value delivery to stakeholders in 
goals KSO 1 and KSO 2) 
Table 1 shows the requirements 
morphological matrix that has been formulated 
to study these ambiguities in more detail, by 
specific alternative options to be considered for 
each requirement variable. The size of the 
unconstrained tradespace of requirements in this 
formulation is of 21,600 possible requirement 
sets (unconstrained estimate). To allow 
comparison with existing architectural baselines, 
the analysis is focused on a representative 
mission portfolio comparable to existing NASA 
baselines such as the ones defined by HAT for 
NEAs, ESAS for the Moon, and DRA 5.0 for 
Mars, as outlined in the literature review in 
Section I. 
Table 2 shows logical constraints that have 
been formulated to generate this portfolio of 
representative missions. 
 
Table 2 Logical Constraints  
for Requirements Enumeration 
Constraints
Description
IF Destination is Moon, OR IF Destination is Mars, AND 
Characteristic Destination Size IS NOT N/A OR Characteristic 
Destination Composition IS NOT N/A, THEN Architecture is 
Infeasible
IF Destination is Mars, AND (Exploration Time is 1m AND Total 
Mission Duration is NOT EQUAL TO 1y), OR (Exploration Time is 
1.5y AND Total Mission Duration is NOT EQUAL TO 2.5y), THEN 
Architecture is Infeasible
If Maximum Total Mission Duration LESS than Exploration Time at 
Destination, THEN Architecture is Infeasible
If Mission Mode is Flyby and Exploration Time at Destination IS 
NOT 0d, THEN Architecture is Infeasible
 
 
Value associated with requirement sets is 
defined by a multiplicative multiattribute utility 
Requirement Requirement Alternatives No# Alt.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Destination Moon Mars Low Energy 
NEA
High 
Energy 
NEA
4
Characteristic Destination Size <30m 30m-100m 100m-500m 500m-1km >1km N/A (Dest. 
is not NEA)
6
Characteristic Destination Composition Carb. Silic. Metallic Other N/A (Dest. 
is not NEA)
5
Number of Crew (# crew) 3 4 6 3
Exploration Time at Destination (days) 7d 21d 30d 180d 550d 5
Maximum Total Mission Duration at Full-
Scale Capability (years) - Health Risk 
Proxy
<= 6m 1y 1.5y 2y 2.5y 3y 6
Mission Mode Orbit Surface 2
Tot. Arch. 21600
Table 1 Requirements Morphological Matrix 
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(MAU) function (Keeney and Raiffa 1976) 
combining the following property variables: 
 
- Total time of flight (as proxy for health risk) 
- Exploration time at destination 
- Delta V capability beyond Escape orbit 
- Number of crew 
- Destinations 
- Object size (if destination is NEA) 
- Object destination (if destination is NEA) 
MAU functions are elicited by interviewing 
expert panels. Property variables are elicited 
using ordinal scores. Equal complementary 
MAU weights have been assumed for this 
analysis. Not all property variables are assumed 
equally relevant to the three panels. Table 4 
shows the assumptions that have been used 
regarding relevance of each property variable for 
the science, exploration and policy panels that 
have been formed. These assumptions have been 
defined by an iterative verification process 
involving interviewees of all panels. 
 
Function-form mapping 
Functions of the in-space transportation 
infrastructure architecture are mapped to 
architectural elements as shown in Figure 2. The 
architecture is defined by a set of habitat 
elements and transportation elements. The 
mapping assumed here is not the only one 
possible for a transportation architecture. This 
mapping has been chosen to be compared with 
existing NASA point designs. Mapping 
functions to a varying number of elements of 
form can be modeled as a set partitioning 
problem (Selva 2012), which is an avenue of 
interest for future research in this application. 
Different technology options for each element of 
form have been identified and organized in an 
architecting model, as described in the following 
discussion. 
 
Architecting model 
 
Architectural decisions and corresponding 
alternatives for the elements of form is organized 
in an architectural morphological matrix 
(Simmons 2008) as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 Architectural Morphological Matrix 
Architectural Decision Architectural Alternatives No# Alt.
1 2 3
Cargo Pre-Deployment via SEP Flight Yes No 2
Propellant Boil-off Control Yes No 2
In-Situ Resource Utilization Yes No 2
Aerocapture Yes No 2
Trans-Departure Injection Propellant 
Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 NTR 3
Descent Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 2
Ascent Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 2
Trans-Earth Injection Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LCH4 NTR 3
Tot. Arch. 576  
 
Table 4 Value attributes and their assumed relevance to expert panels 
Value Attributes and their Relevance  
to Expert Panels 
Science Panel Exploration Panel Policy Panel 
Total Time of Flight (Health Risk) Less Relevant Relevant Relevant 
Exploration Time at Destination Relevant Relevant Relevant 
Delta V Capability beyond Escape Orbit Less Relevant Relevant Less Relevant 
Number of Crew Less Relevant Relevant Relevant 
Destinations Relevant Relevant Relevant 
Object Size (if NEA) Relevant Less Relevant Relevant 
Object Composition (if NEA) Relevant Less Relevant Less Relevant 
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The design space is composed by 576 
possible architectures per requirement set 
(constrained estimate). This results into an 
(unconstrained) integrated design space size of 
~12.4m architectures.  
 
The tradespace was explored with the 
following metrics: 
- Exploration Value 
- Science Return 
- Policy Return 
- Initial Mass in LEO (IMLEO) 
- Architecture Risk Ranking (ARR) 
Architecture Risk Ranking (ARR) is 
introduced in this paper, and defined as an 
ordinal metric to rank architectures according to 
an overall risk assessment based on requirement-
related (Table 6) and architectural-related (Table 
5) risks. Risks  are ranked with an ordinal scale 
from 1 (low risk) to 3 (high risk). Architectural 
risks are further distinguished by past flight 
heritage, as defined by proxy units of measure 
(such as landed mass for an aerocapture system). 
Architecture Risk Ranking is a normalized 
weighted sum of these two risk types. This 
discussion presents the analysis assuming equal 
weights.  
 
Model Validation 
The model has been validated by comparison 
with existing architectural baselines, as shown in 
Table 7. The validation consisted in evaluating 
DRA 5.0, Apollo 11, and NASA NEA 
architectures with the architecting model 
integrating exploration/science/policy value 
metrics (which details are defined later in this 
section), a performance/cost proxy metric 
(defined by IMLEO), and an ordinal 
architectural risk metric (the ARR defined in the 
previous section).  
This chapter integrates DB-SAF with the 
IMLEO estimation model for in-space 
infrastructured developed by (Rudat, Battat et al. 
2012) - who also validated IMLEO numbers 
using the same reference architectures used in 
this study - and with the novel ARR model 
defined in this section. 
 
Step 3/4 – Expert Panel Formation – Problem 
Formulation Review with Expert Panel 
Three expert panels represented Exploration, 
Science and Policy stakeholders. All panels were 
composed by senior experts involved in the 
architecture of the future human spaceflight 
infrastructure in the United States and in Europe. 
A total of 15 experts was involved in the study, 
where each expert has been engaged in a three-
round DB-SAF process. Expert contributions are 
provided in anonymous form. Some experts 
agreed to be identified as participants of the 
study; their participation is acknowledged at the 
end of the paper. In no case contributions are 
explicitly attributed to any of those experts to 
protect their anonimity. Table 8 provides a 
synopsis on the composition of expert panels. As 
per Step 4, the final problem formulation as 
presented in this paper has been reviewed and 
agreed with expert panels as part of the first 
iteration of the study. 
 
Step 5 – Design of Interview 
Interviews asked experts to give ordinal 
scores to value properties, such as potential 
exploration destinations, amount of delta V 
beyond Earth Escape orbit made available by the 
in-space transportation infrastructure, and so 
forth.  
 
Step 6 – Elicitation of Expert Value Judgment 
A total of 45 interviews were conducted to 
inform this study. Interviews were conducted in 
person, on VoIP teleconference and over the 
phone November 2011 and January 2012. 
 
Step 7 – Results Analysis 
 
Exploration Panel – Elicitation of Value 
Functions 
The exploration panel has been called to elicit 
value judgments on what constitutes exploration 
value for the in-space exploration infrastructure. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show DB-SAF results of 
the exploration panel. All DB-SAF plots can be 
read as follows; the red lines represent median 
values (50% percentile) of the answers as given 
by the panel. The lower and upper edges of the 
blue boxplots represent the 25% and 75% 
percentile respectively. The black whiskers 
represent maximum and minimum values given 
by experts. Red crosses are outliers. These plots 
were generated at each DB-SAF iteration and  
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Destination Risk Time at Destination Risk
Moon 1 0d 1
Mars 3 7d 2
Venus 3 14d 2
NEA Low Energy 1 21d 2
NEA High Energy 1 1m 2
3m 3
Object Size (if NEA) Risk 6m 3
< 30 m 1 1y 3
30m-100m 1 1.5y 3
100m-500m 1
500m-1km 1 Time of Flight Risk
> 1km 1 6m 1
N/A 1 1y 2
1.5y 2
Object Composition (if NEA) Risk 2.0y 3
Carb 1 2.5y 3
Silic 1 3.0y 3
Metal 1
Other 1 Mission Mode Risk
N/A 1 Flyby 1
Sortie 2
Number of Crew Risk Surface 3
1 crew 3
2 crew 3 Legend
3 crew 2 Low Risk 1
4 crew 2 Moderate Risk 2
5 crew 1 High Risk 3
6 crew 1
7 crew 1
Requirements Risk Elements
Boiloff Control Proven Heritage No Heritage Ascent Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Not Relevant N.A. N.A. Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 120mt > 120mt
Yes 2 2 LOX/LH2 1 2
No 1 1 Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All
LOX/LCH4 1 2
ISRU Proven Heritage No Heritage
Heritage Unit: Not Relevant N.A. N.A. Descent Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
Yes 3 3 Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 120mt > 120mt
No 1 1 LOX/LH2 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All
Aerocapture Proven Heritage No Heritage LOX/LCH4 1 2
Heritage Unit: Landed Mass [mt] N.A. N.A.
Yes 2 2 TEI Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage
No 1 1 Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 110mt > 110mt
LOX/LH2 1 2
Transit Vehicle Propellant Type Proven Heritage No Heritage Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 120mt > 120mt LOX/LCH4 1 2
LOX/LH2 1 2 Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 75mt > 75mt
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] N.A. All NTR 2 3
LOX/LCH4 1 2
Heritage Unit: Prop. Mass [mt] <= 75mt > 75mt
NTR 2 3
Architectural Risk Elements
Table 6 Requirement Risk Elements 
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Figure 2 Function-Form Mapping of the In-space Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Table 5 Architectural Risk Elements 
63rd International Astronautical Congress, Naples, Italy. Copyright ©2012 by Alessandro Aliakbargolkar, Alexander Rudat, and Edward Crawley. 
All rights reserved. 
IAC-12-D1.4.6         Page 9 of 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Destination: NEA Destination: NEA
Characteristic Size: 300m Characteristic Size: 300m
Characteristic Composition: Carbonaceous Characteristic Composition: Carbonaceous
Number of Crew: 4 Number of Crew: 4
Exploration Time at Destination: ~7 days Exploration Time at Destination: ~30 days
Total Mission Duration: ~1 year Total Mission Duration: ~1.5 years
Mission Mode: Surface Mission Mode: Surface
Boiloff Control: No Boiloff Control: No
ISRU: No ISRU: No
Aerocapture: N/A Aerocapture: N/A
Transit Prop. Type: LOX/LH2 Transit Prop. Type: LOX/LH2
Ascent Prop. Type: N/A Ascent Prop. Type: N/A
Descent Prop. Type: N/A Descent Prop. Type: N/A
TEI Prop. Type: NTO/N2O4 (MPCV) TEI Prop. Type: NTO/N2O4 (MPCV) + LOX/LH2
Transit Vehicle Heritage No Heritage Transit Vehicle Heritage No Heritage
Ascent Vehicle Heritage No Heritage Ascent Vehicle Heritage No Heritage
Descent Vehicle Heirtage No Heritage Descent Vehicle Heirtage No Heritage
TEI Vehicle Heirtage No Heritage TEI Vehicle Heirtage No Heritage
Total IMLEO: 2 x 70mt SLS (140mt) Total IMLEO: 3 x 70mt SLS (210mt)
Exploration Value: 0.35 Exploration Value: 0.65
Science Value: 0.5 Science Value: 0.68
Policy Value: 0.33 Policy Value: 0.69
Architectural Risk Ranking: 0.33 Architectural Risk Ranking: 0.33
Low Energy NEA (HAT 2000SG34) High Energy NEA (HAT 2008EV5)
Model-generated Evaluations Model-generated Evaluations
Destination: Mars Destination: Moon
Characteristic Size: N/A Characteristic Size: N/A
Characteristic Composition: N/A Characteristic Composition: N/A
Number of Crew: 6 Number of Crew: 3
Exploration Time at Destination: ~1.5 years Exploration Time at Destination: ~3 days
Total Mission Duration: ~2.5 years Total Mission Duration: ~8 days
Mission Mode: Surface Mission Mode: Surface
Boiloff Control: Yes Boiloff Control: No
ISRU: Yes ISRU: No
Aerocapture: No Aerocapture: N/A
Transit Prop. Type: NTR/LH2 Transit Prop. Type: LOX/LH2
Ascent Prop. Type: LOX/LCH4 Ascent Prop. Type: NTO/N2O4
Descent Prop. Type: LOX/LCH4 Descent Prop. Type: NTO/N2O4
TEI Prop. Type: NTR/LH2 TEI Prop. Type: NTO/N2O4
Transit Vehicle Heritage No Heritage Transit Vehicle Heritage Proven Heritage
Ascent Vehicle Heritage No Heritage Ascent Vehicle Heritage Proven Heritage
Descent Vehicle Heirtage No Heritage Descent Vehicle Heirtage Proven Heritage
TEI Vehicle Heirtage No Heritage TEI Vehicle Heirtage Proven Heritage
Total IMLEO: 848.7mt Total IMLEO: 1 x Saturn V (120mt)
Exploration Value: 1.00 Exploration Value: 0.24
Science Value: 1.00 Science Value: 0.28
Policy Value: 0.81 Policy Value: 0.15
Architectural Risk Ranking: 0.88 Architectural Risk Ranking: 0.21
NASA Design Reference Architecture 5.0 Apollo 11
Model-generated Evaluations Model-generated Evaluations
Table 7 Architectural Model Validation 
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presented to experts. Experts could see where 
their answers lied in the distributions, and could 
change them to either move towards consensus 
(median value), diverge from consensus, or keep 
their answers through iterations. In all cases, 
motivations were asked to justify their positions. 
By interacting between each other in anonymous 
form through DB-SAF, experts were able to 
express their judgments without peer pressure 
and being able to explain their reasoning clearly, 
therefore giving the opportunity to document the 
whole process for analysis. Experts in the 
exploration panel reached the best consensus 
among panels. The figure shows six plots, each 
one representing one value metric. The sixth 
panel shows weights assigned to value metrics in 
the aggregate multiplicative (hence nonlinear) 
MAU formulation. The convention in all value 
metrics – in this and on science and policy 
panels as well - is that of value-maximizing 
stakeholders.  
 
Time of Flight (as a proxy for health risk): 
Time of flight is a proxy of health risk as 
astronauts are more likely to face adverse 
conditions from exposure to the harsh radiation 
environment beyond the Van Allen Belts. The 
shape and gradient on this curve depend on risk 
aversion of individual experts in the panel. Risk 
averse experts argue that safety is a key feature 
for any future mission of the human spaceflight 
program Risk taker experts point at an excessive 
stress to safety as one of the main causes of cost 
growth and schedule slippage in past exploration 
programs. They argue that exploration as such is 
an inherently risky venture. Therefore, risk 
should be accepted as part of the program to 
enable sustainable access to new destinations in 
the Solar System.  
Time at destination (Moon/Mars): experts in 
Figure 3 Exploration Panel - Round 3 
1 Senior Expert (former President of a EU Space Agency)
2 Decision Makers from NASA and ESTEC
1 Senior Advisor from a US Research Institution
1 Professor from Academia (US)
1 Professor from Academia (US)
Exploration Panel
Science Panel
Policy Panel
1 Senior Scientist from a US Research Institution
3 Professors from Academia (US)
1 Senior Scientist from a European Industrial Organization
4 Senior Systems Architects & Decision Makers from NASA and ESA
Table 8 Expert Panels Composition 
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the exploration panel were able to reach 
consensus on value associated to surface stay 
times on large planetary bodies. The underlying 
curve is an S-curve, where the shape and the 
gradient are representative of the marginal value 
increase or saturation associated with short stay 
and long stay durations. Experts agree that value 
associated to surface stay time has increasing 
marginal returns for short stays, as contribution 
to exploration value in the first days of 
exploration is significant, as new areas are 
explored and new operations initiated on the 
surface. The right-hand side of the curve shows 
diminishing marginal returns, meaning that the 
added value of an additional day on the surface 
when several months have already been spent 
there is low. Experts were specifically asked not 
to include orbital constraints in their assessment. 
This was motivated by the intent to derive a 
curve to compare propulsion technologies and 
mission modes in a second phase of the analysis.  
Time at destination (NEA): time at NEA 
destinations was measured on a different time 
scale as agreed with experts. The open debate in 
this context can be traced to different 
assumptions by experts on time required for 
preparatory and system check-out operations. 
Such ambiguity could not be reduced in three 
rounds of iterations among experts, despite 
sharing expert opinions on those matters. Further 
discussion and drafting of a specification in this 
context with particular reference to detailed 
concepts of operations in the public domain of a 
NEA mission are advisable to reduce this 
ambiguity. 
Number of crew: experts reached consensus 
in that 3 (same crew size as Apollo 11) is the 
minimum number of crew required for any 
exploration beyond LEO. Marginal value returns 
with added crew members is mostly linear as 
being proportional to the cumulative number of 
exploration operations that could be conducted 
on the mission. Diminishing marginal returns at 
4 crew. This is in coherence with the current 
baseline of the Multi-Purpose Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (MPCV) as developed by NASA 
(NASA 2012). 
Relative weights: experts agree that the 
choice of a destination for exploration and time 
spent at the destination are primary drivers in the 
evaluation of exploration architecture. Relative 
ranking between the two is unclear, as the two 
Figure 4 Exploration Panel - Destination choice - Round 3 
Mars 
Moon 
NEA 
Venus 
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boxplots mostly overlap, signaling a tie in this 
context. Number of crew is the second most 
relevant attribute from an exploration 
perspective. Time of flight is predominantly seen 
as the last factor of interest in evaluating 
architectures.  
Destinations: the choice of a destination 
shows the most irreducible ambiguity in all 
panels that have been involved in the studyThe 
debate on destinations is found to be strongly 
opinionated – while in previous decisions 
experts were willing to compromise, DB-SAF 
iterations on destinations showed little room for 
negotiations. While evolutionary patterns 
between fly-by, orbit, sortie and long stay 
mission modes were widely recognized across 
the panel, the relative ranking between 
destinations was not. Furthermore, some 
destinations generated interest only with some 
experts - such as EML1 or Venus. Notably, 
NEAs are part of this category. While NASA’s 
current efforts are focused on the development of 
a mission to a NEA, not all experts agree on the 
validity of such destination.  
 
Exploration Panel – Main Highlights 
The following points emerge as main 
highlights from the development of 
representative value functions for the exploration 
panel. 
 
Time at Destination (NEA): 
• Exploration value between 14-days and 
21-days is an irreducible ambiguity in 
different assumptions on Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) – in particular due to 
different assumptions on time required for 
system check-out and testing before 
commitment to NEA surface operations. 
• The development of a common and open 
standard on a detailed mission CONOPS for 
NEA missions is recommended.   
Destinations: 
• Highest degree of irreducible ambiguity. 
At the same time, the panel ranked 
destinations as first most important attribute 
in the evaluation procedure. 
• Debate is highly opinionated, 
impossibility of reaching consensus. 
• Open debate on destination selection is 
highly recommended to reduce associated 
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ambiguity within NASA and with 
international partners. Of particular interest 
is reduction of ambiguity on NEA mission 
architectures, which evaluation in terms of 
exploration panel appears bimodal, with 
experts giving high value to NEA missions 
versus experts giving zero value to NEA 
missions. Both parties did not agree in 
modifying their position at any point during 
the debate due to fundamental different 
value assumptions. 
 
 
Science Panel – Elicitation of Value Functions 
 
Science experts shared the opinion that 
science in a human spaceflight program is a 
complementary objective, certainly important 
but not primary. DB-SAF results of the science 
panel are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. A 
discussion on the set of property variables of 
interest to scientists follows. 
Time at destination (Moon/Mars): Science 
return is perceived as proportional to exploration 
time at the destination.  
Time at destination (NEA): Value associated 
with time on NEAs featured a double plateau, 
due to different types of science that could be 
done on that mission. Remote sensing and 
internal tomography of NEA interiors is possible 
via orbit operations, therefore representing early 
value delivering activities such a science 
program. Additional time spent (associated with 
NEA surface operations) increases value 
significantly by enabling sample return and 
geological field work activities. A maximum 
time of 3 months is foreseen on the surface for a 
first NEA mission. 
Object size (NEA): for NEAs with a 
characteristic size greater than 30m, science 
value is insensitive to object size. 
Object composition (NEA): While all 
compositions are of interest to answer questions 
in planetary science, carbonaceous objects 
emerge as clear priorities due to their importance 
in answering relevant questions in astrobiology 
and planetary formation. Carbonaceous NEAs 
are samples of thermally unprocessed, pristine 
material from the origin of the Solar System. 
Relative weights: the science panel followed 
a value-driven approach, where the choice of a 
destination was clearly recognized as the first 
priority in evaluation. Second to it object 
composition, although this opinion varied 
according to whether the expert in question was 
concerned with science related to NEA 
composition (such as geologists). Time spent at 
the destination emerged as third priority. Object 
size and time of flight tied as last priorities, as 
also shown in the discussion above. 
Destinations: Clear evolutionary trends are 
found in Mars, Moon and NEA missions. As 
NEAs are valuable evidence to study planetary 
formation and the origin of the Solar System, 
they were retained by the panel of high science 
value. No or little science value was associated 
to EML1, SEL2 and Venus manned flyby/orbit 
missions, as neither of those benefit of humans 
as enablers of science. 
 
Science Panel – Main Highlights 
• Humans are seen as enablers of certain 
science (such as sample return and geology 
field work) and evaluations calibrated 
accordingly. 
• Carbonaceous are a privileged NEA 
category as they are samples of thermally 
unprocessed, pristine material answering 
questions on planetary formation and the 
history of the Solar System. 
• Object composition is key for NEA 
mission selection. NEA size does not matter, 
unless looking at specific NEA science 
questions such as rubble pile versus onion 
shell theories for NEA internal composition, 
which can also be answered by use of 
tomography instruments. 
Policy Panel – Elicitation of Value Functions 
The policy panel followed more qualitative 
logics in the evaluation than other panels. DB-
SAF policy panel results are shown in Figure 7 
and Figure 8. 
Total time of flight (as proxy for health risk): 
time of flight was not seen only in light of 
technical constraints, but also considering policy 
constraints such as short-term policy return. 
Certain policy experts in the panel motivated 
their answers based on the fact that US Congress 
63rd International Astronautical Congress, Naples, Italy. Copyright ©2012 by Alessandro Aliakbargolkar, Alexander Rudat, and Edward Crawley. 
All rights reserved. 
IAC-12-D1.4.6         Page 14 of 20 
changes in 2 year cycles, and a US President in 4 
year (one term) and 8 year (two terms) cycles. 
Ambiguity on this value function could be 
effectively reduced in three iterations. 
Time at Destination (Moon): the panel 
proposed to consider this measure separately for 
Moon, Mars and NEAs. For the Moon, the 
maximum was identified in 6 months for a lunar 
base settlement, in agreement with previous 
experience with the International Space Station. 
The trend over time follows a curve with 
diminishing marginal returns. Value was 
estimated as zero for a seven day Moon sortie, as 
experts stated the desire for new Moon programs 
to advance from the Apollo era and have an 
impact on media and the public opinion. 
Time at Destination (Mars): a step-wise trend 
was identified by the panel, marking the 
difference between 30 day sortie and 550 sortie 
mission modes. The DRA 5.0 baseline for 
Figure 7 Science Panel - Destination Choice - Round 3 
Figure 6 Policy Panel - Round 3 Results 
      
Mars 
Moon 
NEA 
Long 
Stay 
Long 
Stay Flyby Orbit Sortie Flyby Orbit Sortie Flyby Orbit Sortie 
Phobos 
Deimos SEL2 Flyby Orbit EML1 
Significant less ambiguity 
than in the exploration panel! 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Destinations 
Congress 
2-year cycle 
“have to do better than Apollo” 
“have to do better than Apollo” 
Motivated by impact on media 
and public 
Motivated by impact on media 
and public 
Priorities left unclearly defined 
Object composition deemed less relevant. 
(except for one expert motivated by the development 
of a space economy based on asteroid mining) 
Time of Flight (health risk proxy) Time at Destination (Moon) 
Time at Destination (Mars) Time at Destination (NEA) 
Number of Crew 
Relative Weights 
Object Size (NEA) 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
Va
lu
e 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 
63rd International Astronautical Congress, Naples, Italy. Copyright ©2012 by Alessandro Aliakbargolkar, Alexander Rudat, and Edward Crawley. 
All rights reserved. 
IAC-12-D1.4.6         Page 15 of 20 
surface stay (~18 months) is on the point of 
diminishing marginal returns of the curve. 
Time at Destination (NEA): a clear trend 
showing diminishing marginal returns was 
identified by the panel. Value saturates at 1 
month of exploration, with substantial value 
delivery (> 50%) at 2 weeks of exploration. This 
was motivated as policy experts believe such a 
mission would have greater impact on media and 
the public in the short term rather than in the 
long term. This conclusion suggests to keep 
mission duration in the order of one month, in 
accordance with NASA baseline NEA 
architectures. 
Number of Crew: the panel took the Apollo 
program as a reference considering a crew range 
between 3 and 6 crew members, with a linear 
increase in value in this range. 
Object Size: value increases proportionally to 
object size showing diminishing marginal 
returns. Object size is related to the impact on 
the media and the public associated with the 
mission.  
 Object composition was deemed irrelevant 
by policy experts. An exception is made by 
experts advocating for the development of a 
space economy, who are therefore interested in 
NEA objects which composition suits the needs 
for the development of asteroid mining ventures. 
Relative Weights: an unclear priority ranking 
was elicited by the panel. High irreducible 
ambiguity is due to the plurality of non 
reconcilable intents.  
This last result implies the lack of strong 
leadership driving worldwide policy opinions.  
Destinations: No clear evolutionary trends 
were identified between missions modes (flyby, 
orbit, sortie and long stay).. In some cases, orbit 
missions were deemed more valuable than 
surface missions as experts believed these alone 
deliver significant impact to the media and on 
public opinion, while enabling exploration 
opportunities provided by tele-robotic 
exploration on planetary surfaces – therefore 
mitigating communication lags. 
 
Policy Panel – Main Highlights 
• No clear leadership or consensus 
emerging, which implies the need to bring 
concepts for further evaluation.  
• Time scale arguments were based on 
impact on media and public opinion, and were 
based on coherence with possible political 
changes rather than scientific/engineering 
Figure 8 Policy Panel - Destination Choice - Round 3 
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Surface mission value not agreed by all experts. 
Orbit missions valuable to some experts due to 
impact on media and interest in tele-robotic 
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rationale. 
• No evolutionary trends in destination 
choice was found between mission modes (flyby, 
orbit, sortie and surface long stay) as perceived 
by other panels. 
• Orbit missions were deemed valuable by 
some policy experts for their impact on media 
and public opinion (such as in Apollo 8). 
Step 8 – Aggregate Results Discussion 
 
The expert elicitation process described so far 
represents the first part of the study, where 
system objectives for the in-space infrastructures 
have been identified along with their associated 
uncertainties – or ambiguities. In other words, 
the study identified how value – or benefits – is 
measured by stakeholders for a transportation 
infrastructure. Leveraging on this result, this 
section shows a first-order benefit-cost analysis 
of the in-space transportation infrastructure, and 
performs tradespace exploration to characterize 
architectural decisions .  
 The proxy measure for benefit is defined as 
the weighted average of median values of value 
functions derived by the expert panels. Weights 
represent panel preferences. A proxy for cost is 
defined as the total delta V that the infrastructure 
needs to provide for a given destination / mission 
mode (for instance Moon Sortie, or Mars Long 
Stay). We neglect Venus in this analysis, as 
expert elicitation results results have shown this 
choice was dominated in value in all panels by 
other destinations.  
Sensitivity analysis results to different panel 
weights are shown in Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 
11, and Figure 12. The following results emerge 
from the first-order benefit/cost analysis shown 
in the abovementioned figures: 
• NEA destinations are always on the 
Pareto front. Low-energy NEAs represent 
efficient benefit/cost tradeoffs being on the kick 
of the curve. This result is confirmed in all the 
scenarios considered in the sensitivity analysis. 
• While high-energy NEAs are always 
dominated in a Pareto sense, they represent 
destinations of interest as they require higher 
capabilities in terms of delta V, better 
approaching energy requirements of future Mars 
missions. 
• Value associated with mission duration 
and mission mode (flyby vs orbit vs sortie vs 
long stay) is moderately panel dependent. Said 
value is higher for exploration and science 
biased scenarios, for which longer durations are 
preferred. Value is lower in the policy-biased 
scenario, as policy experts showed preference for 
shorter mission durations for early value return 
within Presidential and Congressional mandates. 
• Value associated with EML1 and SEL2 
destinations is highly panel dependent. They 
show high value (close to the Pareto front) in the 
policy-biased scenario, as these destinations 
comply with current policy guidance (as of Q1 
2012), and represent a gateway for future 
exploration as discussed previously. An 
exploration-biased assumption returns moderate 
value from these destinations, since technology 
development is enabled by these destinations 
(while having lower exploration value when 
compared to other alternatives). Value is low in a 
science-bias assumption, as EML1 and SEL2 are 
empty points in deep space, where no human-
enabled science (such as sample return) can be 
performed.  
Step 9 – Convergence Criteria 
A maximum number of three iterations has 
been used as termination criteria for DB-SAF. 
The choice of a convergence criteria resulted 
from a tradeoff between expert’s time 
availability and the focus of the architecting 
study. Convergence has been verified with 
experts; they confirmed that they were unlikely 
to change their answers in a fourth round of DB-
SAF, therefore the study was called to a close. 
 
Step 10 – Recommendations 
The following recommendations emerge from 
the analysis: 1) The choice of a destination is the 
predominant irreducible ambiguity affecting the 
architecture of in-space transportation 
infrastructure, with particular impact on 
exploration-related and policy-related 
stakeholders. 2) No clear leadership or consensus 
emerging among policy makers in setting a 
direction for human spaceflight, which implies 
the need for NASA to bring new concepts for 
further evaluation. 3) In NEA architectures, 
prefer carbonaceous, large-sized (>100m) NEA 
destinations to leverage on added value of 
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human presence for enhanced sample return. 4) 
Develop an open standard on a detailed mission 
CONOPS for NEA missions to reduce ambiguity 
on exploration value definition. 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper implemented a Delphi-Based 
Systems Architecting Framework for the 
architecting problem of in-space transportation 
infrastructure for human exploration beyond 
Low Earth Orbit. This study identified the 
ambiguities in  the definition of the functional 
intent in the infrastructure architecture, with 
direct impact on value delivery to stakeholder as 
expressed by goals. The most important result of 
the analysis is the identification of a critical 
irreducible ambiguity undermining success in 
delivering value for the in-space transportation 
infrastructure of the next three decades: 
destination choice. While NASA’s program of 
record at the time of writing of this paper is 
focused on architecting a human spaceflight 
mission to a Near Earth Asteroid, consensus on 
this architecture is far from being reached by the 
community at large, with particular reference to 
exploration and policy stakeholders.  
The realization of this ambiguity is a call for 
NASA to promote an open forum on this topic, 
and to develop a strong case for investments in 
the human spaceflight industry in the next 
decades by policy makers. Ambiguity and 
current lack of consesus in policy leadership, as 
emerged by this study, are critical items to be 
addressed in today’s early design stages of the 
design of in-space systems for successful 
development, implementation, operations and 
value delivery of the infrastructure of tomorrow. 
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Figure 9 Benefit-Cost Analysis Results - Equal Weights (33.33% Exploration, 33.33% Science, 33.33% Policy) 
 
Figure 10 Benefit-Cost Analysis Results - Exploration Bias Scenario (60% Exploration, 20% Science, 20% Policy) 
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Figure 11 Benefit-Cost Analysis Results - Science Bias Scenario (20% Exploration, 60% Science, 20% Policy) 
 
Figure 12 Benefit-Cost Analysis Results - Policy Bias Scenario (20% Exploration, 20% Science, 60% Policy) 
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